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Brown: Miranda and the Womb

Miranda and the Womb
Geneva Brown
INTRODUCTION

What I may see or hear in the course of treatment, which of no account
may be spread abroad,I will keep to myself hold such things shameful to be
spoken about.
HippocraticOath
The doctor-patient relationship is sacrosanct. However, this is not the case
in Indiana. Instead, Indiana challenges the doctor-patient relationship with
the legislature's requirement of legal and medical mandatory reporters.@ The
imposition of mandatory reporters often results in a breach of trust in the
doctor-patient relationship, which not only can severely damage the
relationship, but also harm the patient or client. In Indiana, this harm rises to
prosecution and prison.0 Indiana requires doctors to breach confidentiality
and assist in prosecuting their patients, with a distinct focus on pregnant
women.D Women in critical stages of their pregnancy risk arrest and
conviction when they seek medical assistance,0 and clients who disclose past
criminal activity may face prosecution.0
Women acting in desperation because of unwanted pregnancies face
severe sanctions by the state of Indiana. Proceeding with a pregnancy beyond
the first trimester implicates the state in whatever a woman's choices. The
more the fetus develops and becomes viable, the greater the state's interest in
the pregnancy. A woman can be held culpable for her actions by the state
once she allows the pregnancy to proceed into the second and third trimesters.
The medical profession assists in sanctioning women who either induce
abortions or attempt suicide. Both scenarios display a need for mental health
intervention, but resulted in prosecutions to the fullest extent of the law.
States that choose to criminalize the behavior of pregnant women assert

1.
IND. CODE § 31-33-5-4 (2017).
2.
See Lynn Paltrow, Roe v. Wade and the New Jane Crow.: Reproductive Rights in the
Age ofMass Incarceration,103 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH No. 1, 18 (2013).

3. Id. at 17 (documenting the rise of fetal personhood and how it is being used as the
basis of arrests, detentions and forced detentions on pregnant women).
4.
5.

Id.
Id.
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concern for the fetus. 0 However, this concern for the fetus pits the mother
against the fetus and the state, while simultaneously pitting doctors and
lawyers against the individuals they are meant to serve: namely, pregnant
women in need of medical attention. In Indiana, pregnant women who seek
medical attention must be informed of their Miranda rights before receiving
treatment. This runs afoul of the doctor-patient relationship, as pregnant
woman turned criminal defendants will necessarily withhold
communications from their doctors to avoid being blindsided and prosecuted.
Indiana courts allow for an overbroad application of feticide laws that
interfere with criminal defendants' Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination.
Two cases highlight the dangers of Indiana's interpretation. In Part I of
this article, I discuss the cases of Purvi Patel and Bei Bei Shuai as examples
of how Indiana used its feticide laws to prosecute pregnant women and reach
beyond the original intent of the statute.0 In Part II, I analyze how
medicolegal conflicts arise when the medical profession treats the fetus as a
separate legal person from the mother. In Part III, I review the origin of
Indiana's feticide laws and how overly zealous prosecutors deviated from the
original intent of the law by prosecuting pregnant women. Lastly, in Part IV,
I consider the disturbing trend of prosecuting mothers and pregnant women
when they access medical care and the constitutional concerns that arise. I
conclude by asserting the need for a civil Miranda when at-risk women
become community pariahs and are prosecuted for endangering their fetuses.
I. BACKGROUND

A. Purvi Patel
Purvi Patel lived in Granger, Indiana where she managed the family
restaurant.0 Purvi, unbeknownst to her family, engaged in a sexual
relationship with a married man.D Purvi was not aware that she was pregnant
until a friend mentioned she should visit a doctor after complaining of cramps

6.

See generally JEAN REITH SCHROEDEL, IS THE FETUS A PERSON? A COMPARISON OF

POLICIES ACROSS THE FIFTY STATES, (Cornell University Press 2000) (providing a study of

the rise of fetal personhood in a 50-state survey). See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992) (allowing states to assert a state interest in a viable fetus); IND. CODE § 1634-1-9 (2017) (asserting a compelling state interest in a fetus of 20 weeks as the fetus is then
capable of feeling pain).
7. Patel v. State of Indiana, 60 N.E.3d 1041, 1044 (Ind. App. 2016) (vacating the
feticide conviction that was the basis of the 20-year sentence but holding that Purvi did
endanger the fetus); Shuai v. State of Indiana, 966 N.E.2d 619, 622 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).

8.

Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1044.

9.

Id.
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and missing her menstrual cycle.0 Upon confirming her pregnancy, she hid
it from her family.[] Purvi wanted to terminate the pregnancy, but knew that
she was beyond the acceptable time to take "a pill" and, instead, ordered
Chinese tablets to end the pregnancy.Ii
Purvi ingested four Chinese tablets over three days to begin the abortion. 5
The next day, she began bleeding and cramping, and Purvi aborted the fetus
on her bathroom floor.0 Purvi continued to have cramps and pass blood
clots.0 On the way to the hospital, Purvi disposed of the fetal remains in a
restaurant dumpster, and then went to the hospital.0
Dr. Tracy Byrne was the attending physician for Purvi.0 Dr. Byrne
consulted her partner, Dr. Kelly McGuire, regarding the potential cutting of
the umbilical cord.0 Both doctors provided medical care to Purvi, in addition
to working in concert with the Grange police department.0 At times, the duty
to their patient overlapped with the duty of being a mandatory reporter.
Eventually, the doctors assisted law enforcement.0 Purvi, the patient,
became secondary to the doctors' concerns and assisting in the Purvi's
prosecution became their primary function. Purvi was never given her
Miranda warnings.0 Dr. McGuire posed questions that would end up being
the basis of the state's case against her, and Purvi answered the questions and
incriminated herself.
Once Dr. McGuire surmised that the fetus could be alive, he took the
extraordinary step and accompanied the Grange, Indiana police to locate the
fetus. 5 Purvi, in a weakened state, transitioned from patient to defendant.
Purvi was in route to surgery after substantial blood loss during the
miscarriage. 5 Instead of receiving Miranda warnings, warnings about self-

10. Id.
11. Id at 1045. Patel texted her friend "[m]y Faro would kill me n him."
12.
Id. Later that day, Patel ordered mifepristone and misoprostol online from a Hong
Kong pharmacy for $72 and had the package shipped to Moe's so "no one [would] know."
13. Id.at 1045-46.
14. Id.at 1046.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.("Dr. McGuire had been participating in the search for approximately thirty to
forty-five minutes").
21. Id.("Patel was asked for more specific information regarding the baby's location,
and she ultimately revealed that she had put the baby in a plastic bag and placed it in a
dumpster...").
22. Id.; Brief for Appellant at 7, Patel v. State, 60 N.E.3d 1041 (Ind. App. 2016) (No.
71A04-1504-CR-166) [hereinafter, Brief for Appellant: Patel].
23. Brief for Appellant: Patel, supra note 22, at 6.
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incrimination, or the consequences of her answers, she cooperated with the
doctors attending to her, and with law enforcement. 5 When the police and
Dr. McGuire were unable to locate the fetal remains, Dr. McGuire called St.
Joseph's Hospital to obtain more details from Purvi regarding how she
disposed of the fetus. 5 Purvi offered more details, and the police eventually
located the remains of the aborted fetus. 2 Essentially, Purvi incriminated
herself by telling the police where to find the fetal remains. The "life-saving"
mission quickly transitioned into a criminal investigation. The state of
Indiana used the autopsy results of the fetus and the expert testimony of a
forensic pathologist to convict Purvi Patel of feticide.0 Purvi's trial, and
ultimate conviction, resulted in the trial judge issuing a 20 year sentence. 5
Purvi, in an emotionally and physically weakened state, incriminated
herself and assisted in her own eventual prosecution. The question presents
itself of whether Dr. McGuire was a doctor on a lifesaving mission, or a state
actor working in furtherance of a criminal investigation. Once Dr. McGuire
was in the company of law enforcement, he ceased being a doctor and
appeared to transform into a state actor. Dr. McGuire specifically sought the
remains of the fetus in the presence of, and along with, the Grange police. 5
And though Indiana, similar to the majority of states, requires mandatory
reporting of child endangerment, 9 mandatory reporting does not require a
doctor's presence at a potential crime scene. E Even if Dr. McGuire could be
considered a mandatory reporter, his role as a doctor on an emergency call

24.

Id.at 6-7.

25.
26.

Id.at7.
Id.

27.

Id.at 9-10, 13.

28. Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1048.
29. Brief for Appellant: Patel, supra note 22, at 7.Doctors are mandated to save the life
of the fetus if the fetus from a partial birth abortion remains alive after the abortion is
performed. IND. CODE § 16 -34 -2-3 (c) (2017). Purvi Patel had no medically performed
abortion. She attempted a self-induced abortion. See IND. CODE § 16-34-2-7(a) (a person
who knowingly or intentionally performs an abortion not expressly provided for in this
chapter commits a Level 5 felony... ").Indiana Code provides:
An abortion may be performed after the earlier of the time a fetus is viable or the
time the post fertilization age of the fetus is at least twenty (20) weeks only if
there is in attendance a physician, other than the physician performing the
abortion, who shall take control of and provide immediate care for a child born
alive as a result of the abortion. During the performance of the abortion, the
physician performing the abortion, and after the abortion, the physician required
by this subsection to be in attendance, shall take all reasonable steps in keeping
with good medical practice, consistent with the procedure used, to preserve the
life and health of the viable unborn child. However, this subsection does not
apply if compliance would result in an increased risk to the life or health of the
mother. IND. CODE § 16-34-2-3(b).
30.

IND. CODE § 31-33-5-4 (2017).

31.

Id.at§ 31-33-5-1.
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terminated once the Grange police located the fetal remains. The police
presence satisfied the doctor's responsibility as a mandatory reporter, and
alleviated Dr. McGuire's duty to notify a local agency of child harm. The
doctors eventually determined that Purvi miscarried at 25 weeks, 5 and
Indiana statutes define fetus viability beginning at 20 weeks.B Thus, the
remains of Purvi's fetus became the evidence in the state's case against her,
and Dr. McGuire's role was altered from mandatory reporter to state actor.
Afterwards, Dr. McGuire's remaining role was a prosecution witness. Dr.
McGuire testified beyond the capacity of an eyewitness and became the
State's expert witness, becoming a state actor. Dr. McGuire testified, not only
to what he saw, but the effects of what he saw. Specifically, Purvi Patel's
Appellant Reply Brief describes the impact of the doctor's testimony:
Dr. McGuire testified he believed it possible he might find a live baby in
the Target parking lot, but he was describing his thinking before the body
was found - whq "guesstimates" based on the umbilical cord ranged from
25 to 30 weeks.E
The brief further noted the doctor's testimony in describing whether
Purvi's fetus could survive:
Q. Okay. Based on your training and experience and based on what you
saw, would you expect a baby of that developmental age to exhibit signs
of life upon birth?
A: [Dr. McGuire] Yes.
Q: Such as?
A: [Dr. McGuire] Just movement, possibly crying.E
Notably, the questions asked for Dr. McGuire's training and experience
and asked questions based on what he saw. The former appears to be
something asked of an expert working on behalf of the state, while the latter
appears to be that of a fact-based, neutral witness. Ultimately, the state of
Indiana charged Purvi with feticide, which requires proof that the fetus was
alive during birth.0 Dr. McGuire's testimony as an expert was key for the
supposition that Purvi's fetus was alive at birth.0 Thus, Dr. McGuire became

32.
33.

See Brief for Appellant: Patel, supranote 22, at 9.
IND. CODE at § 16-34-1-9.

34. Reply Brief for Appellant at 4, Patel v. State, 60 N.E.3d 1041 (Ind. App. 2016) (No.
71A04-1504-CR-166) [hereinafter, Reply Brief for Appellant: Patel].
35. Id.
36. Id. at 3-4.
37. Id. at 4.
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a state agent.
1. Mandatory Reporting and the Purvi Patel Case
The intent of Indiana's mandator, reporting laws is to provide protection
for abused and neglected children.U The mandatory reporting requirement
encompasses all parties in contact with a potentially abused child, including
doctors and attorneys who have a confidentiality ethos.0 The primary focus
of the law was to identify abused and neglected children-not to prosecute
offenders.0 And yet, in Purvi's case, the law was transformed as a
prosecutorial one. Not only was the law transformed, Dr. McGuire's presence
at the scene where the fetus was found, transformed his role from medical
provider into a mandatory reporter and prosecution witness. Moreover, Dr.
McGuire used his role as a state actor to call the hospital and require Purvi to
answer incriminating questions.0 No attorney was on hand to advise Purvi,
and law enforcement did not advise Purvi of her Miranda rights.0 Having
miscarried, under heavy medication, and suffering from substantial blood
loss, the answers she gave to Dr. McGuire's inquiry eventually led to her
trial, conviction and imprisonment.0 Thus, Dr. McGuire's inquiry was
pivotal in the prosecution of Purvi. The doctor's role, like that of Dr.
McGuire, was transformed based on Indiana's mandatory reporting
requirement and feticide laws.
When Dr. McGuire called to gain information from Purvi, the
quintessential question is whether Purvi was free to leave.0 The answer is
both yes and no. Purvi was not in custody for interrogation or arrest purposes,
but she also was not free to leave the hospital. Purvi sought medical care for
the excessive bleeding she suffered from the miscarriage.0 After waking up
38.
39.

IND. CODE §31-33-1-1 (2017).
IND. CODE at § 31-33-5-1 ("Duty to make report. Sec. 1. In addition to any other

duty to report arising under this article, an individual who has reason to believe that a child is
a victim of child abuse or neglect shall make a report as required by this article.").
40.
41.
42.
43.

Daymude v. State, 540 N.E.2d 1263, 1266 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989).
Brief for Appellant: Patel, supra note 22, at 7.
See generally, id.
Id. at 6-7.

44.
Compare Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. 178, 185-86 (2013) (noting that as the
individual was "free to leave" he was outside the scope of the Fifth Amendment), with
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-68 (1966) (noting that Mirandarights applied to

individuals in custody).
45. See IND. CODE § 16-34-2-7(d) Performance of an Unlawful Abortion (2016)
(explicitly not allowing for prosecution of women who receive partial birth abortions). See
IND. CODE § 16-34-2-7(d) (2016) (explicitly prohibiting prosecution of women upon whom
partial birth abortions are performed). The statutory construction seems to suggest that a
woman who obtains a partial birth abortion in accordance with the statute is exempt from
prosecution, while one who performs it herself may be subject to prosecution. Compare IND.
CODE § 16-34-2-7(a) (stating that "a person who knowingly or intentionally performs an

https://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol27/iss2/3
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from the surgery, a Grange Police Detective, Galen Pelletier, questioned
her.0 While Dr. McGuire's actions blurred the lines between physician and
state actor, Purvi's hospital bed became her place of detention when
Detective Pelletier questioned her as she recovered from anesthesia.0 As a
result, Purvi went into St. Joseph's Hospital for treatment, and left the
hospital a feticide suspect. St. Joseph's, as an agent of the state, held a duty
to warn Purvi, as a patient, that they cooperate with law enforcement. She
needed medical assistance, but her doctors became a key component in her
conviction. The death of a fetus is not a private matter, for the state has a
compelling interest in the life of the fetus that supersedes the rights of the
birth mother or the right to confidentiality of the medical patient.
Dr. McGuire joined the Grange police to search the area where Purvi
discarded the fetal remains of her miscarriage.0 Based on how Purvi
discarded the remains, she did not want them to be found.0 The doctor and
law enforcement searched for the fetus without success, needing to make an
additional inquiry with Purvi to complete the search.E Once found, the
remains became the basis for the feticide charge. 5 Dr. McGuire conducted
the search with law enforcement officers after consulting on Purvi's
condition as a patient. As such, the doctor began to blur the lines of medical
care provider and state actor.
A conflict of laws exists in cases such as Purvi Patel's-the mandatory
reporting laws versus the Fifth Amendment. The mandatory reporting laws
required Dr. McGuire and other medical professionals who treated Purvi to
contact law enforcement.0 With the fetus located, it then transformed an
abuse and neglect investigation into a criminal investigation. The doctor was
sent to rescue a fetus after treating Purvi. The mission failed, and the doctor
became one of the leading witnesses in the prosecution's case-in-chief. Dr.
McGuire cooperated in the investigation and testified against Purvi.E]
Consequently, the prosecutor used the doctor's role and knowledge to bolster

abortion not expressly provided for in this chapter commits a Level 5 felony"), with IND.
CODE § 16-34-2-7(d) (stating that " [a] woman upon whom a partial birth abortion is
performed may not be prosecuted for violating or conspiring to violate section 1(b) of this
chapter").
46.
47.
48.

See Brief for Appellant: Patel, supranote 22, at 7.
Id.
Id.

49.

Id.

50.

See Id. at 6 (noting that Purvi Patel discarded the fetal remains in a Target store

dumpster).
51. Id. at7.
52. IND. CODE § 35-42-1-6 (2017).
53. Id.
54. IND. CODE § 31-33-5-4 (2017).
55. Brief for Appellant: Patel, supra note 22, at 7.
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the state's case against Purvi.0 Purvi incriminated herself in a physically and
mentally weakened state when she spoke to Dr. McGuire and law
enforcement officers. She had no medical or prenatal care while pregnant and
did not seek any medical advice regarding terminating her pregnancy. Purvi
induced a crude self-abortion, not understanding the medical and legal
consequences. The state used her vulnerable state to violate her rights against
self-incrimination. Pregnant women who are impoverished, with substance
abuse problems, or lack prenatal care are highly susceptible to prosecution.
Their only safeguard is the Constitution.
B. Bei Bei Shuai
In the case of Bei Bei Shuai, a woman became distraught when her
boyfriend, who was married to another woman, informed her that he would
not be continuing their relationship.0 At the time Bei Bei was eight months
pregnant, and became despondent and suicidal.8 Because of her suicidal
ideations, Bei Bei ingested rat poison purchased from a hardware store, but
ultimately, did not die.0 Later, the police received an anonymous call and
conducted a welfare check on Bei Bei.0 During the welfare check, she
convinced the officer that she was fine.0 Bei Bei's friend later convinced her
to go to a local hospital, where she was admitted and eventually transferred
to Methodist Hospital in Indianapolis.0
Methodist initially treated Bei Bei for her mental health and obstetric
concerns, but later transitioned from treating Bei Bei for depression and rat
poison ingestion to providing her incriminating medical advice. Methodist
medical staff advised her on decisions that would eventually lead to her
murder charges.0 Instead of appointing legal counsel for a depressed and
suicidal woman to assist in making life-altering decisions or warn Bei Bei of
the consequences of her choices, she became the first woman charged with
feticide as a mother, and not as a third party.
Bei Bei and her baby progressed enough that discharge was imminent, and
on December 25, 2010, hospital staff informed Bei Bei that she could be
discharged within a day or two.0 Unfortunately, on December 31, 2010,

56.
57.

Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1053-54.
Shuai v. State of Indiana, 966 N.E.2d 619, 622 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).

58.
Id.
59.
Id.
60.
Id.
61.
Id.
62.
Id.
63.
Brief of Appellant at 5, Shuai v. Indiana, 966 N.E.2d 619 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (No.
49A02-1106-CR-486) [hereinafter, Brief of Appellant: Shuai].
64.
Id.

https://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol27/iss2/3
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things took a turn for the worse.0 A doctor detected an unusual fetal heart
rate and advised Bei Bei to consider caesarean surgery to protect the baby.0
The doctor warned Bei Bei of the potential risks, which included her own
death and the death of her baby.0 Despite these risks, Bei Bei consented to
the surgery and gave birth to a female infant she named Angel.0
From December 31, 2010 to January 2, 2011, Angel remained in the
neonatal unit while Bei Bei recovered from her caesarean procedure.0
Unfortunately, Angel began to hemorrhage.0 On January 2, 2011, the
neonatal doctor informed Bei Bei that Angel's prognosis looked dim, and
Angel needed to be removed from the life-supporting ventilator.0 While Bei
Bei decided whether to remove Angel from life support, Methodist staff
simultaneously contacted Marion County authorities, including the Marion
County Coroner. 5 The Coroner subsequently informed the Indianapolis
Metropolitan Police Department ("IMPD") and the Marion County
Department of Child Services ("DCS").] DCS informed Methodist that it
would be Bei Bei's decision as to Angel's medical care, including removing
life support or other medical interventions.0 On January 2, 2011, Bei Bei
agreed to remove Angel from the ventilator.E She held Angel for five hours
after the staff removed her from life support.0 Angel then died on January 3,
2011.E
Angel's death triggered an immediate investigation by the Marion County
Coroner and the IMPD.E The IMPD obtained Bei Bei's medical records
without a warrant or her permission.0 As a result, Bei Bei became suicidal
once again, and transferred to the psychiatric unit of Methodist where she
remained for thirty-two days.0
Methodist eventually released Bei Bei on February 4, 2011 .E3 The Marion

65.

Id.

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5-6.
Id. at 6.

75.

Id.

76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 6.

80.

Id.at 13.

81.

Id.
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County Prosecutor charged Bei Bei with murder and attempted feticide.E
After an interlocutory appeal, the Indiana Court of Appeals ordered her
release on February 8, 2012.0 However, Bei Bei remained in custody for 435
days until she posted a $50,000 bond on May 22, 2012.0 At a status hearing
on August 2 2013 Bei Bei pled to the misdemeanor charge of criminal
recklessness.l In retur, the Marion County Prosecutor dismissed the murder
and attempted feticide charges.0
C. IndianaProsecutingPregnantWomen
Indiana set a precedent for charging pregnant women with feticide for the
unfortunate deaths of fetuses by utilizing a law meant to sanction violent acts
against pregnant women and their unborn children.E Normally, the fetal
deaths prosecuted under this law have been under tragic circumstances, and
with mothers under a great amount of stress.8 Bei Bei Shuai was hospitalized
for suicidal ideation after losing her baby and originally ingesting rat
poisoning; Purvi Patel after inducing crude abortion lost a substantial amount
of her blood. El Both of these women were under great physical and mental
strain. In each situation, the medical profession was the catalyst for
prosecution.0 Furthermore, the feticide charges in both cases have been
reduced or dismissed.0 These cases demonstrate that a problem exists in both
the criminal justice system and the medical profession. The problem begins
with how the women are treated when they seek medical treatment and are
reported to law enforcement.
II. FETUS VERSUS MOTHER MEDICOLEGAL RESPONSE
When the United States Supreme Court declared that women had the right
to privacy to have abortions, a parallel and paradoxical legal response arose:

82.
83.
84.

Id.
Shuai, 966 N.E.2d at 622.
Tim Evans, Judge Could Call Up to 200 Jurorsin Bei Shuai Case, INDIANAPOLIS

STAR (June 1, 2013), https://www.newspapers.com/newspage/107925702/.
85.
See State of lndiana v. Bei Bei Shuai, 49G03-1103-MR-14478; see also David
Stafford, Shuai Case Resolved, Thorny Legal Issues Remain, INDIANA LAWYER (Aug. 14,

2013), http://www.theindianalawyer.com/shuai-case -re solved-thomy -legalissuesremain/PARAMS/article/32 121.
86.
Stafford, supra note 85.
87.

Sarah Kaplan, Indiana woman jailedfor 'feticide. " It's never happened before.,

WASHINGTON POST (Apr. 1, 2015),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morningmix/wp/2015/04/0 1/indiana-woman-jailed-for-feticide-its-never-happenedbefore/?utm term=.74fd002flf2f.
88.
89.

Id.
See supra Sections I.A, I.B.

90.
91.

Kaplan, supra note 87; see also Brief of Appellant: Shuai, supra note 63.
Stafford, supra note 85; Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1062.
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fetal rights. 5 The rise of fetal rights puts the mother/patient-doctor
relationship in a legal quandary. Legislators and courts place doctors in a
precarious position with their patients when the law interferes with the
relationship: Statutes require doctors to report their pregnant patients'
behavior, placing medicine and the law into conflict. 9 Mandatory reporting
laws are just one illustration of what doctors are required to report and
patients can be prosecuted based on information shared to doctors.0 For
example, blood and urine screens of pregnant women are a requirement that
can be used for prosecution of the mother.0 Prosecution of mothers increased
with the rise of fetal viability and fetal rights, and is a drastic shift from past
medical practice and policy. 9 Incongruously, the medical profession only
recently began treating the fetus as a separate patient from the mother.
Prior to Roe v. Wade, medical ethics and practice placed the life of the
fetus as secondary to that of the mother. 0 The law had not readily granted
rights to the fetus until Roe.0 Courts recognized fetal rights in narrowly
defined situations when the rights were contingent upon a live birth. 9 The
fetus did not receive any rights independent of the mother. 2] A decade later
courts began to recognize the rights of the fetus as redress for wrongful death
and criminal casesi2 The medical profession also began to recognize the

92.
Dawn Johnsen, The Creation of FetalRights: Conflicts with Women 's Rights with
Liberty, Privacy and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L. REv. 599, 614 (1986).
93. Id.
94. For example, blood and urine screens of pregnant women are a requirement that can
be used for prosecution of the mother. Kary Moss, Substance Abuse During Pregnancy, 13
HARD.WOMEN'S L.J. 278, 293 (1990).
95. Id.
96. See generally David C. Brody & Heidee McMillin, Combating FetalSubstance
Abuse and Governmental FoolhardinessThrough CollaborativeLinkages, Therapeutic
Jurisprudenceand Common Sense: Helping Women Help Themselves, 12 HASTINGS
WOMEN'S L.J. 243, 249 (2001) (noting that Minnesota, South Dakota, and Wisconsin permit
prosecution of mothers).
97. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Supreme Court held inRoe that a fetus,
even when viable, is not a person under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.at 158. It held
further that a woman's fight to choose, in consultation with her physician, whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy is protected by the constitutional fight to privacy. Id. at 152-53.
Although the Court found that the state has a compelling interest in the "potentiality of
human life" of the fetus after it reaches viability, it concluded that this interest could not
justify prohibiting an abortion even after the point of viability if the abortion is necessary to
preserve the life or health of the woman. Id. at 162-63. See also Johnsen, supra note 92.
98. Roe,410U.S.at 162-63.
99.
Johnsen, supra note 92, at 601. Johnsen noted "Yet because they contained a live
birth requirement, these narrow exceptions were consistent with the prevailing view of the
fetus as part of the woman." Id. One of these first instances of legal recognition of the fetus
involved the fight of inheritance and tort law began looking to the period prior to birth in
order to allow a cause of action for prenatal injuries. Id.
100. Id.
101. See Commonwealthv. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1328 (1984) ("Since at least the
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fetus as a legal person and separate from the mother.
Scientific breakthroughs increased the viability of fetuses outside of the
womb and created an ongoing ethical dilemma of the fetus as a patient.E
Science moved faster than ethics, however, and no clear-cut ethical approach
emerged among medical practitioners and medical ethicists. Medical ethicists
wrestled with the fundamental concepts of what is a person, what is life, and
does life have sanctity.E Medical practitioners viewed the fetus differently
than the pregnant patient and began separating the care of the fetus from that
of the mother.E For example, a 1971 obstetrics textbook noted the progress
care afforded to the fetus:
[S]ince World War II and especially in the last decade, knowledge of the
fetus and environment has increased remarkably. As an important
consequence the fetus has acquired status as a patient to be care or by the
physician as long as he is accustomed to caring for the mother.6

The revolutionary idea of treating the fetus as an independent patient grew
with technological advances.E Another consequence was the increased care
and concern for the fetus. A 1980 journal article in Obstetrics and
Gynecology noted the increased concern for the care of the fetus: [T]he fetus
rightfully achieved the status of second patient, a patient who usually faces
much greater risks of serious morbidity and mortality than does the mother.l
fourteenth century, the common law has been that the destruction of a fetus in utero is not a
homicide... The rule has been accepted as the established common law in every American
jurisdiction that has considered the question."). See, e.g., CAL PENAL CODE § 187 (West
Supp. 1986) ("Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice
aforethought."); ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 38, § 9-1.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); IA CODE ANN. §
707.7 (West 1979); MI CoMP. LAWS. ANN. § 750.322 (West 1968); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-337 (1973); OKL. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 713 (West 1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-201 (Supp.
1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.060 (1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.04 (West 1982).
102. See Jeffrey L. Lenow, The Fetus as Patient: EmergingRights as a Person?, 9 AM.
J.L. & MED. 1 (1983-1984). (identifying potential medicolegal conflicts that may arise as
fetal surgery became an acceptable medical practice and surveying the legal rights of the
unborn person with a particular emphasis on the role of viability in determining those rights).
103.
H. Tristam Engelhardt, Jr, What Is a Person?, in Medicine and the Concept of
Person 169 (Michael Goodman ed., 1988) (examining the concept of person and argues that
terms like "human life" and even "human persons" are complex and heterogeneous, and
finding that human life has more than one meaning with multiple meanings having
implications for medicine).
104. Claire Williams, Priscilla Alderson, and Bobbie Farsides, Conflicting Perceptions
of the Fetus: Person, Patient, 'Nobody', Commodity?, 20 NEW GENETIC & SOCIETY 225
(2001) (describing that medical practitioners and health care staff have varying perceptions
of the fetus including how the pregnant woman decides how she perceives that fetus and
how her ideas influence medical staff and how the practitioner influence a pregnant woman's
perception of her fetus).
105.
L.M. Hellman and J.M. Pritchard, WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS, 199 (14th ed. 1971).
106. Id.
107. J.R. Liberman, W.C. Mazor & A. Cohen, "The Fetal Right to Live", 53
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Further, medical advances made the life of the fetus a separate and urgent
priority.l The separation of care of the fetus from the mother evolved to the
present day fetal rights and fetal legal personhood. El As a result, doctors and
courts began to aggressively intervene on behalf of the fetus.0
Medical treatment and intervention for the fetus became the linchpin used
against the mother. 5 Doctors and hospitals worked against the will of the
mother to enforce medical treatment, citing the health and welfare of the fetus
as the reason for intervention. 1 Early hearings would take place in the
patient's hospital room with a judge, attorneys, and a court reporter
present. 5 The court would determine that the fetus was a dependent and
neglected child, and would proceed to order the mother to have a Cesarean
section to save the fetus's life.1
States sought criminal remedies as well. Prosecutors charged women who
refused Caesarean sections with murder in cases where doctors asserted the
procedure necessary to save the fetus's life.El For instance, in 2004, Utah
filed a first degree criminal homicide charge against a mother who refused a
Caesarean section, resulting in the death of one of her twin fetuses.0 The
fetus became a legal prson, and doctors, the state, and courts gave legal
deference to the fetus. 6 Initially, fetuses were legally defined as a patient
separate from the parent, or mother, and the definition evolved to recognizing
the fetus and parent as separate, independent entities with separate legal
rights and protected interests.E State intervention juxtaposes the mother
against and the fetus, resulting in a caustic legal regime. Indiana went even a
step further when it began to prosecute pregnant women for their behavior
while pregnant and not just for failure to choose medical intervention.0

OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 515 (1979).

108.
Id.
109.
Molly McNulty, PregnancyPolice: The Health Policy and Legal Implicationsof
PunishingPregnantWomen for the Harm They do to Their Fetus, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 277, 289 (1987).

110.

Id.

111.
Id. at 292.
112. Id.
113.
Watson A. Bowes & Brad Selgestad, Fetal Versus MaternalRights: Medical and
Legal Perspectives,58 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 209, 212 (1981) (reviewing the case of a

mother who refused a cesarean operation to save the fetus's life and for whom the hospital
administration intervened, requesting a court order to have to procedure performed against
the mother's will).
114. Id. at 210.
115. Id.
116. Francie Grace, Utah C-Section Mom Gets Probation,CBS NEws (Mar. 12, 2004),
http://www.cbsnews.con/news/utah-c-section-mom-gets-probation/.
117. Id.
118. McNulty, supra note 109, at 280.
119. Id. at 291.
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A. The HippocraticOath
In both the Purvi Patel and Bei Bei Shuai cases, the key component of
prosecution was the advice or testimony elicited from doctors. Due to the
impact of the doctors, both Patel and Shuai could have faced 20 years to life
in prison. As previously mentioned, mandatory reporting was not implicated
in either case.0 Thus, the facts beg the question of why the doctors gave
incriminating advice or testified against their own patients.
The classic Hippocratic Oath asserts "What I may see or hear in the course
of treatment... which of no account may be spread abroad, I will keep to
myself, hold such things shameful to be spoken about."E Author Dale Smith
notes that the Hippocratic Oath serves three functions in modem medicine:
1) an obligation to voluntarily assume practice according to the ethics
affirmed in the text; 2) a professional statement to the public about the ethics
of the profession; and 3) the oath takers' and lay witnesses' awareness of and
affirmation of the venerable tradition of social and professional
responsibility.E The doctors in the Patel and Shuai cases fail to affirm the
text in the Hippocratic Oath. Dr. McGuire's testimony gave an eyewitness
account of finding the fetal remains.0 As harrowing as the doctor's
discovery was, he then proceeded to testify about whether the fetus was still
alive after "birth."3 The doctor's testimony damned Purvi. Their actions
were far from upholding the oath. Further, the public testimony of Dr.
McGuire did not engender the public with confidence. Potentially, even
worse was Shuai's case in which physicians advised a suicidal mother to take
her baby off life support, and then transformed her care into a criminal
investigation: a failure of confidence as well. Ethically, an emergency
appointment of a guardian would have been more appropriate, upholding the
role of the doctor versus that of the state. But, the hospital became a party to
the investigation. The doctors failed in the social and professional
responsibility to uphold the oath.
III. INDIANA FETICIDE LAWS
In 1835, Indiana enacted its first statute criminalizing behavior that caused
pregnant women to miscarry.0 The state did not punish women in Indiana

120.

See supra Sections I.A, I.B (discussing the implications of mandatory reporting in

each case).
121.

Peter Tyson, The Hippocratic Oath Today, PBS (Mar. 27, 2001),

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/body/hippocratic-oath-today.html.
122. Dale C. Smith, The Hippocratic Oath and Modern Medicine, 51 J. OF THE HISTORY
OF MEDICINE & ALLIED SCIENCES 484 (1996).

123.
124.
125.

Patel, 61 N.E.3d at 1045.
Id.
Sandra L. Smith, FetalHomicide: Woman or Fetus as Victim- A Survey of Current
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seeking to procure a miscarriage; instead, the State punished the service
provider who induced the miscarriage.B The statute criminalized induced
miscarriages.0 Nearly fifty years later, Indiana lawmakers determined that
pregnant women should be punished, in addition to the service provider,
because of their agency in seeking miscarriages.0 As a result, Indiana
legislators added pregnant women to the punishment regime.[E In 1881, the
Indiana General Assembly not only punished pregnant women, but rewrote
the original statute, adding harsher penalties to include women who had an
illegally induced miscarriage or died from the miscarriage.El The statute,
however, failed to distinguish punishment between the women procuring the
miscarriages from the women dying from the miscarriages. 5 The intent to
induce the miscarriage was the illegal act, not necessarily the outcome. 5
Further, the service provider was only liable if either or both the pregnant
woman and fetus died.
Sanctions for terminating or attempting to terminate
a pregnancy bordered on tyrannical. Indiana's legislative history is silent as
to the circumstances that motivated the General Assembly to create such
harsh punishments for service providers and criminalize the behavior of
pregnant women whose actions caused miscarriages. While pregnant women
were prohibited from intentionally inducing miscarriages, no law existed in
Indiana until the 1970s that addressed fetal existence separate from the
pregnant woman.
In 1979, the Indiana legislature enacted its first feticide statute. E ] The

State Approaches and Recommendationsfor Future State Application, 41 WM. & MARYL.
REv. 1845, 1853 (2000) [hereinafter, FetalHomicide: Woman or Fetus as Victim].
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. IND. CODE § 1924 (1881) ("Every woman who shall solicit any person any
medicine, drug, or substance or ting whatever, and shall take the same, or shall submit to any
operation or other means whatever, with the intent thereby to procure a miscarriage (except
when a physician for the purpose of saving the life of the mother or child), shall be fined not
more than five hundred dollars nor less than ten dollars, and imprisoned in the county jail not
more than twelve months nor less than thirty days; and any person who, in any manner
whatever, unlawfully aids or assists any such woman to a violation of this section shall be
liable to the same penalty.").
130. IND. CODE § 1923 (1881) ("Whoever prescribes or administers to any pregnant
woman, or to any woman he supposes to be pregnant, any drug, medicine, or substance
whatever, with intent thereby to procure the miscarriage of such woman; or, with like intent,
uses any instrument or other means whatever, unless such miscarriage is necessary to
preserve her life, -- shall, if the woman miscarries or dies in the consequence thereof, be
fined not more than five hundred dollars nor less than fifty dollars, and imprisoned in the
State prison not more than fourteen years nor less than three years.").
131.
Id.
132.
133.
134.
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focus of the statute was to penalize third parties who caused the death of a
pregnant woman's fetus,0 and defendants prosecuted under the feticide
statute face a maximum of twenty years in prison.0 The feticide statute
intended to penalize violence perpetrated against a victim that was not a
human being, as defined under Indiana statute.0 In other words, the statute
penalized violence that was perpetrated against a fetus.
Additionally, a fetus's death resulting from an attack on a pregnant woman
became the basis of feticide charges. 5 When a husband strangled his
pregnant wife the state prosecuted him for the deaths of his wife and the fetus
she carried.0 In the 1990s, the focus of feticide began to expand beyond
pregnant women who were victims of domestic violence.0 Random violent
acts that killed the fetus also became an area of feticide prosecution. 4 In
1995, Melanie Knox, an eight-month regnant woman suffered gunshot
wounds and delivered a stillborn baby.d The court imposed a maximum of
eight years of prison for the death of the Knox baby.0 As a result of the
verdict, Ms. Knox and her boyfriend, Kevin Elmore, lobbied to increase
criminal sentencing from a Class C to a Class A felony.0 In 1997, the
Indiana legislature did not raise the penalty for feticide, but overhauled the
murder statutes by overriding the governor's veto.0
In 1997, the Indiana legislature codified feticide in all homicide statutes.E
The codification included a drastic provision: the murder of a pregnant
woman that resulted in the intentional death of a viable fetus could serve as

terminates a human pregnancy with an intention other than to produce a live birth or to
remove a dead fetus commits feticide, a Class C felony. This section does not apply to an
abortion performed in compliance with IC 35-1-58.5.").
135.
Id.
136. Id.
137. Bairdv. State, 604 N.E.2d 1170, 1189 (1992).
138. See id. at 1175; see also Shane v. State, 716 N.E.2d 391, 396 (Ind. 1999)
(prosecuting the defendant, under an accomplice theory, for plotting to kill his friend's
pregnant girlfriend, who died, along with her fetus, of gunshot wounds).
139. Baird,604 N.E.2d at 1175.
140. See Fetal Homicide: Woman or Fetus as Victim, supra note 125, at 1879-80.
141.
See id.
142. Id. at 1853 (citingJennifer E. Smith, Grieving Families Seek Law Change,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, June 28, 1995, at El, ("reporting the case of an Indiana couple who
criticized the low penalties in the state's feticide law after they had been shot and injured as
they sat on their porch, killing her eight-month-old fetus")).
143.
Id.
144. Id.
145.
Id. (citing Editorial, A Vote for the Unborn's Worth, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Jan. 24,
1998, at A8, ("reporting the governor's concern that physicians could be prosecuted for lateterm abortions, even though the legislation exempted legal abortions")).
146. Id.
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an aggravating circumstance for a death sentence or life imprisonment.E
Additionally, voluntary and involuntary manslaughter included new
provisions that penalized causing the death of a viable fetus.E The
legislature even rewrote aggravated battery to include causing the death of a
fetus, which increased the penalty to a Class B felony.0 As evidenced by
these developments, the Indiana legislature accorded great deference to the
idea of the personhood of the fetus and the expansion of fetal rights.
The Indiana legislature continued to respond by bringing down an
increasingly firm hand against acts of violence towards a fetus. In 2008,
during a bank robbery, a bank robber shot a teller who was five months
pregnant with twins and suffered a miscarriage.0 Outrage over the deaths of
the twin fetuses caused a State proposal to the legislature for removal of the
viability requirement in the murder statute.0 Rather than changing the
viability requirement, Indiana instead responded by substantially increasing
the penalty for feticide from a Class C felony to a Class B felony.0 The
initial intent of Indiana feticide laws was to punish violent acts against a fetus
by a third party.0 The Bei Bei Shuai and Purvi Patel cases expanded the
intent of infanticide to prosecute the mother of the fetus.0
The prosecutors in the Patel and Shuai cases took advantage of a law that
did not explicitly exclude charging pregnant women. Counsel for Bei Bei
Shuai challenged her murder charge, insisting that it was never the intent of
the Indiana legislature to charge pregnant women with murder.0 The State
countered that the statute need not have an explicit prohibition for pregnant
women to be prosecuted for acts that harm the fetus.0 The Indiana Court of

147.
148.
149.
150.

IND. CODE
IND. CODE
IND. CODE
Shot Bank

§ 35-50-2-9(16) (2012).
§ 35-42-1-3(2) (2009); IND. CODE §35-42-1-4(2)(b) (2009).
§ 35-42-2-1.5(3) (2009).
Teller Loses Twins,RTV 6 ABC (Apr. 26, 2008, 6:05 AM),

https ://www.theindychannel.com/news/shot-bank-teller-loses-twins.
151.
Steven Ertelet, IndianaProsecutor Wants Unborn Victims Law to Apply
ThroughoutPregnancy,LIFENEws, (Apr. 30, 2008, 9:00 AM),
http://www.lifenews.com/2008/04/30/state-3 182/.

152. IND. CODE § 35-42-1-6 (2009).
153.
See Shuai, 966 N.E. 2d at 635-36 (Riley, J., dissenting) ("[I]t
was never the
intention of the legislature that the feticide statute should be used to criminalize prenatal
conduct of a pregnant woman."); Andrew S. Murphy, Survey of State FetalHomicide Laws
and Their PotentialApplicability to PregnantWomen Who Harm Their Own Fetuses, 89
IND. L.J. 847, 857 (2014).

154. See generally Paltrow, supra note 3 (discussing the rise of fetal personhood and
how it is being used as the basis of arrests, detentions and forced detentions on pregnant
women); see also supra Sections I.A, I.B (discussing the prosecution of Bei Bei Shuai and
Purvi Patel).
155.
Shuai, 966 N.E.2d at 628.
156. Id. at 629.
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Appeals agreed with the State.0 Analyzing English common law, the court
found that where no law existed, the prosecutor was free to charge pregnant
women with murder and feticide.l
However, the court was wrong. I argue the common law does not yield to
laws that do not exist.0 Instead, where no laws exist, common law fills the
gap.0 The intent throughout the history of the born alive rule in English
common law was to punish third party conduct towards pregnant women, not
punishing pregnant women themselves.0
The Court of Appeals eventually acknowledged that it was not the
legislative intent to charge pregnant women with feticide.E In the Patel
decision, the court held that the feticide statute did not explicitly address
pregnant woman, and the legislature drafted a specific abortion statute.0
Therefore, the legislature did not intend the feticide statute to apply to women
who have abortions.El The Court of Appeals finally put an end to
overzealous prosecution of pregnant women and women have abortions.
IV. CRIMINALIZING MOTHERS AND CIVIL MIRANDA

Any mother who falls short of the idealized version of motherhood risks
the ire and punishment of the society and the state. The social construction
of the good and the bad mothers, according to sociologist Evelyn Nakano
Glenn, stems from motherhood being the normal and expected role for
women as women have the reproductive role.E The expectation is that
women possess maternal instincts and desire to be mothers.L0 If women fall
short of such desires, it is problematic. 0 Society views pregnant women who

157.
Id.
158.
Id. at 630.
159.
Geneva Brown, Bei Bei Shuai: Pregnancy,Murder andMayhem in Indiana, 17 J.
GENDER, RACE & JUST. 221, 244 (2014).
160.
Id. at 242.
161.
Id. at 243.
162.
Patel, 60 N.E. 3d at 1044.
163.
Id. at 1059-61.
164.
Id. at 1061.
165.
Evelyn Nakano Glenn, Social Construction of Mothering: A Thematic Overview, in
PERSPECTIVES ON GENDER 1, 3 (1994).
166.
April Cherry, Shifting Our Focusfrom Retribution to Social Justice: An
Alternative Vision for the Treatment of PregnantWomen Who Harm Their Fetuses, 28 J.L.
& HEALTH 6, 41 (2015) (quoting ANN OAKLEY, WOMAN'S WORK: THE HOUSEWIFE, PAST AND

PRESENT 186 (Random House Inc. 1974)) ("Motherhood is viewed not just as natural and
instinctive, but as required - consider, for instance, the "maternal instinct." The notion that
women have, or should have, a "maternal instinct" reinforces the belief that all women
should be and desire to be mothers."); J. SWIGART, THE MYTH OF THE BAD MOTHER: THE
EMOTIONAL REALITIES OF MOTHERING 8 (Doubleday ed. 1991).
167.
SWIGART, supra note 166.
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engage in negative behavior that affects the fetus as "bad mothers."D Society
deems women who act contrary to female nature as deviant;E6 consequently,
these women risk falling outside of the law's protection.E
Twenty-six years ago, scholar Lisa Ikemoto warned about the dangers of
state intervention using fetal rotection laws as a disguise to interfere with
pregnancy and motherhood.1 Ikemoto asserted that "fetal protection policy
was the attitude, put into writing and backed by the courts, that women could

be controlled, excluded, and marginalized in order to protect fetal and other
interests." 2 Unfortunately, Ikemoto's foretelling came to fruition because
states prioritized fetal protections over the rights of the mothers. 5 However,
while many state legislatures passed infanticide laws to protect the fetus,

168.
MOLLY LADD-TAYLOR & LAURI UMANSKY, "BAD" MOTHERS: THE POLITICS OF
BLAME IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA 3-4 (1998) (discussing the three general
categories of "bad" mothers into which women have been classified over the last century);
see Cherry, supra note 166, at 45 ("Pregnant women who engage in behavior that may, or is
believed to, negatively affect their fetuses, often fall into all three of Ladd-Taylor and
Umansky 'bad' mother classifications. They are often single, poor, and uneducated and
participate in behaviors thought to produce sub-standard children. Moreover, female gender
norms are heightened with regard to pregnant women. Pregnant women are expected to be
all-sacrificing toward their fetuses. Not only are they are expected to give up their lives for
their fetuses, they are expected, after death, to continue their sacrifice.").
169.
Janice G. Raymond, Reproductive Gifts and Gift Giving: The Altruistic Woman, in
LIFE CHOICES: A HASTINGS CENTER INTRODUCTION TO BIOETHICS 302, 306 (Joseph H.
Howell & William Frederick Sale eds., 2d ed. 2000) ("There is, moreover, a distinct moral
language that is part of this tradition that celebrated women's altruism. It is the language of
selflessness and responsibility toward others in which women's very possibilities are framed.
It is the discourse of materialism, which traditionally has been the discourse of devotion and
dedication in which women may turn away their own needs. [... ]Ifa woman chooses a
different destiny and directs herselfelsewhere, she risks placing herselfoutside female
nature and culture." (emphasis added)).
170.
See Cherry, supra note 166, at 36 (citing Susan Marken, Feeding the Fetus: On
Interrogatingthe Notion of Maternal-FetalConflicts, 23 FEMINIST STUD. 351 (1997))
(arguing that the development of fetal rights stems from anti-abortion rhetoric, along with
technological innovation).
171.
Lisa Ikemoto, The Code ofPerfectPregnancy:At the Intersection of the Ideology
of Motherhood, the Practiceof Defaulting to Science and the InterventionistMindset of Law,
53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1205, 1281-82 (1992).
172.
Id.
173.
For a more thorough discussion, see Priscilla Ocen, BirthingInjustice: Pregnancy
as a Status Offense, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1163 (2016); Dara E. Purvis, The Rules of
Maternity, 104 CAL.L. REv. 1299 (2016); Marissa Kreutzfeld, An Unduly Burdensome
Reality: The Unconstitutionalityof State Laws that CriminalizeSelf-inducedAbortions in the
Age ofAbortion Restrictions, 38 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 55 (2016); Vanessa Soderberg, More
than Receptacles: The InternationalHuman Rights Analysis of CriminalizingPregnancy in
the United States, 31 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 299 (2016); Jennifer Henricks, What
to Expect When You Are Expecting: FetalProtection Laws thatStrip Away the
ConstitutionalRights of PregnantWomen, 35 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 117 (2015); Cheryl E.
Amana Burris, Reproductive Rights UnderAttack: Can Fundamentalsof Roe Survive?, 8
BIOTECHNOLOGY & PHARMACEUTICAL L. REv. 1 (2015); Cherry, supranote 166, at 29-30.
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Indiana prosecutors wrongly use infanticide laws to prosecute pregnant
women.El Eventually, the Indiana Court of Appeals forbade the use of the
law in future prosecutions where there were not third-party defendants. 7
The Indiana Court of Appeals was the gatekeeper to protect the rights of
women prosecuted with feticide.P While the court eventually corrected the
misinterpretation of the feticide statute, both Bei Bei Shuai and Purvi Patel
endured lon term incarceration before their cases were modified or
overturned. Ensuring that the Miranda rights of patients such as Shuai and
Patel are sufficiently protected is the best way to avoid the injustices like the
two women faced.E] Warning potential patients at the pre-investigation
phase that their actions may become evidence for a law enforcement
investigation gives them fair warning and protects them from unintentionally
divulging potentially incriminating information. Constitutional protections
are complicated when medical staff is involved in the investigation and
prosecution.
The Supreme Court declared that patients who enter hospitals for
treatment should not be the subject of criminal investigations or have their
Fourth Amendment rights violated.0 In Ferguson v. Charleston, the
Charleston District Attorney trained medical staff on how to collect pregnant
women's urine as part of a criminal investigation, and instructed how medical
staff could maintain chain of custody once the evidence was collected.E The
investigation targeted indigent African American women, ten of whom filed
a § 1983 action against the hospital and Charleston government officials.0
The Court held the hospital violated the patients' Fourth Amendment rights
against illegal search and seizure. [ 3
The hospital sought to justify its actions of conducting drug tests without
the knowledge of the patients and turning over the results to law
enforcement.E - The Fourth Circuit affirmed a lower court's ruling applying
the "special needs" doctrine.0 The Fourth Circuit found that the reasons
174. See Murphy, supra note 153, at 857; see also discussion supra Sections I.A, I.B.
175.
Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1061 (holding that the feticide statute did not apply to pregnant
women who had legal or illegal abortions).
176.

Id.

177. Id. at 1044 (stating that Purvi Patel was charged with over 30 years of
imprisonment for the death of her baby); Stafford, supra note 85 (noting that Bei Bei Shuai
spent over 30 months in prison).
178. See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (discussing the rights of
individuals who have been arrested); U. S. CONST. amend. V.
179. Fergusonv. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 67 (2001).
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id.
Id. at73.
Id. at 86; U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 68.
Id.
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asserted by the Charleston Hospital of "curtailing pregnancy complications
and costs associated with maternal cocaine usage justified the minimal
intrusion on the privacy of the patients.'fl
In reversing the Fourth Circuit decision, Justice Stevens declared that since
MUSC was a state hospital, its employees were _government actors and
"subject to the strictures of the Fourth Amendment. "0 Justice Stevens found
the action of the Charleston hospital far more intrusive than actions taken by
other entities asserting "special needs" when implementing drug or urine
tests. [ l The Court determined that the "special needs" asserted by the
Charleston hospital did not justify the absence of a warrant or individualized
suspicion. 2 More importantly, the hospital dissemination of the drug test
results to third-party law enforcement, who then used it to coerce patients
into drug rehabilitation, was untenable. 8 The Court likened the hospital's
acts to that of having a "general interest of crime control." 2
Neither Shuai, nor Patel's doctors maintained direct links to law
enforcement akin to the medical staff in Ferguson; thus, the constitutional
guarantees of Miranda were not triggered by either case.0 Courts have
rejected civil Miranda claims, including § 1983 claims. 5 For example, the

185.
Id.at 75.
186. Id. at 76.
187. Id.at 78-79 ("In three of those cases, we sustained drug tests for railway
employees involved in train accidents, Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489
U.S. 602 (1989), for United States Customs Service employees seeking promotion to certain
sensitive positions, Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) and for high
school students participating in interscholastic sports, Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton,
515 U.S. 646 (1995). In the fourth case, we struck down such testing for candidates for
designated state offices as unreasonable. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997). In each of
those cases, we employed a balancing test that weighed the intrusion on the individual's
interest in privacy against the "special needs" that supported the program.").
188. Id.at 80-81.
189. Id.
190. Id.at 82.
191.
See supra Sections I.A, I.B (discussing the factual details of the Shuai and Patel
cases).
192. See Jennifer Laurin, Rights Translationand Remedial Disequilibrationin
ConstitutionalCriminalProcedure, 110 COLUM. L. REv. 1002, 1054-57 (2010); see also
Hannonv. Sanner, 441 F.3d 635, 638 (8th Cir. 2006) (T]he admission of Hannon's
statements in a criminal case did not cause a deprivation of any 'right' secured by the
Constitution, within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983."); Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271,
1291 (11th Cir. 1999) ("Failing to follow Miranda procedures triggers the prophylactic
protection of the exclusion of evidence, but does not violate any substantive Fifth
Amendment right such that a cause of action for money damages under § 1983 is
created."); Bennett v.Passic, 545 F.2d 1260, 1263 (10th Cir. 1976) ("The Constitution and
laws of the United States do not guarantee Bennett the right to Miranda warnings. They only
guarantee him the right to be free from self-incrimination."); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(2006); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
397 (1971).

Published by LAW eCommons, 2020

21

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 27 [2020], Iss. 2, Art. 3

Annals of Health Law

Vol. 27

United States Supreme Court rejected the civil application brought by a
former suspect who challenged a statement elicited by law enforcement after
law enforcement failed to give her the constitutionally required Miranda
warning in Chavez v. Martinez.0 Jennifer Laurin proposed that courts
perceive that there is less of a constitutional duty of the police regarding
Miranda warnings, and that courts enforce Miranda at the adjudicatory and
trial phases rather than during a suspect's interrogation.0 The courts only
allow challenges where there is the potential for conviction, rather than
routine violations due to the custodial officer not advising rights.13 The legal
community will not give a remedy to Patel or Shuai cases, so the medical
community must be the arbiter of its own behavior and not become law
enforcement agents.
Indiana law pushed the limits of maternal criminalization to include
pregnant women who were either distressed like Purvi Patel or suffering from
suicidal ideation like Bei Bei Shuai. The medical profession became the
unfortunate catalyst to these women being prosecuted. It is especially
disturbing that the women were in physically and mentally weakened states.
When seeking medical assistance, they received medical professionals acting
as an extension of law enforcement. The Indiana Court of Appeals was the
only mechanism that stopped local prosecutors from continuing this pattern
of prosecutions.
The Patel decision detailed how the Indiana legislature did not intend
illegal abortions to be considered feticide.0 Women who attempted illegal
abortions were not to be treated as murderers. Amicus briefs filed on behalf
of Purvi Patel and Bei Bei Shuai argued vociferously against their
prosecution.E Prosecuting pregnant women for feticide can be likened to
prosecuting pregnant women for substance abuse since the arguments are the
same, and several healthcare organizations have spoken out against
prosecuting pregnant women for substance abuse. 0 The American Academy
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195.
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197. Amended Brief for National Advocates for Pregnant Women and Experts in Public
Health Advocacy and Bioethics as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Patel v. State of
Indiana, 60 N.E.3d 1041 (Ind.App. Ct. 2016).
198.
Stephen W. Patrick & Davida M. Schiff, A PublicHealth Response to Opioid Use
in Pregnancy, 139 PEDIATRICS 3 (2017) ("More than 20 national organizations have since
published statements against the prosecution and punishment of pregnant women who use
illicit substances: these include the American Medical Association, the AAFP, the ACOG,
the American Public Health Association, the American Nurses Association, the American
Psychiatric Association, the National Perinatal Association, the American Society of
Addiction Medicine, the March of Dimes, and the Association of Women's Health, Obstetric
and Neonatal Nurses. Despite the strong consensus from the medical and public health
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of Pediatrics supports the proposition that pregnant women should not be
prosecuted for substance abuse: "[P]unitive measures taken toward pregnant
women, such as criminal prosecution and incarceration, have no proven
benefits for infant health" and argued that "the public must be assured of
nonpunitive access to comprehensive care that meets the needs of the
substance-abusing pregnant woman and her infant."OPublic policy and
medical ethics dictate that prosecuting pregnant women does more harm than
good. Thus, Indiana set a dangerous precedent with the prosecution of Bei
Bei Shuai and Purvi Patel.
CONCLUSION

Indiana women who seek medical attention and have a problem
pregnancy, or are mentally ill, will no longer face the threat of long-term
incarceration. The Indiana Court of Appeals corrected the aberrant behavior
of overly ambitious district attorneys. The legacy remains that doctors and
other medical personnel, however, were willing and eager to see women like
Purvi Patel and Bei Bei Shuai prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. The
danger still exists that medical personnel ignore the Hippocratic Oath for
more politicized issues of abortion, feticide and the life beginning at
conception.
The Indiana Court of Appeals understood the original intent of feticide
legislation was not to incarcerate mothers and pregnant women. The court
corrected the overzealous prosecution of Purvi and Bei Bei. The medical
profession, however, has had no course correction. When doctors seek to
impose their values upon their patients and additionally work in conjunction
with the state, they rob patients of their constitutional rights and their
autonomy. As medical ethicist Dr. Edmund Pellegrino wrote:
Autonomy has taken on a distinctive negative connotation. Arising, as it
did, as a moral claim against invasion of human rights by tyrannous
government, it has come to mean a right of self-determination against those
who would usurp that right. In medical ethics, it is conceived largely as a
moral and legal defense against physician paternalism and against tho5Q
who would impose their values - social, moral, or otherwise - on others.
The shocking and violent choices of Purvi and Bei Bei had dire
communities affirming that a punitive approach during pregnancy is ineffective and
potentially harmful, there has been a recent increase in the number of states passing and
considering criminal prosecution laws that selectively target pregnant women with substance
use disorders.").
199.
200.
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consequences for them. The criminal justice system was on the verge of
locking both women up for decades. Judicial intervention lessened their
punishment and shut the door to future prosecutions. As radical as the
concept may be, Purvi and Bei Bei needed to exercise their autonomy
knowing they would suffer for their choices. Punishment should be meted
out by the legal profession not from the medical staff that assisted them. A
civil protection is needed.
The provision of a civil Miranda D warning serves as a vulnerable
woman's only defense, and the Indiana medical community must craft its
own version to protect pregnant women from the overzealous medical and
legal actors. A civil Miranda would advise patients that whatever information
they gave to the healthcare provider could be used by the healthcare provider
against them or surrendered to law enforcement. The medical profession as a
body has not done proper self-examination of its role in the Purvi Patel and
Bei Bei Shuai cases. As Dr. Pellegrino noted, "[h]uman beings who lack or
have lost the capacity for autonomous actions are nonetheless humans who
retain their inherent dignity."
Only through critical evaluation by the
medical profession and the creation of a civil Miranda can the inherent
dignity of these women, who have seemingly lost the capacity for
autonomous action by the prosecution of these state laws, be maintained.
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Mathew G. Weber, InternalInvestigations,Self-Disclosure andRemediationfor
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healthcare provider investigates its own employees, "counsel typically will provide
advisements to employees (sometimes called "civil Miranda advisements") designed to
explain that they represent the provider organization (or the authorizing committee) rather
than the employee, that the employee's cooperation is expected, that the employee must tell
the truth." Id
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